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Abstract:
Trade and business associations and professionalmembership societies likemany other political interest groups
in theUnited States advocate and lobby their interests in the policy arena. Yet, we lack the understanding of how
organizational capabilities shape different forms of political engagement in trade and professional associations.
Research on the political involvement of tax-exempt organizations has been focused on charitable nonprofits.
Studying the elements that underlie political action strategies and tactics of trade and professional associations
would expand our understanding of political engagement in the nonprofit sector. In our sample of occupational
mutual benefit associations, both resource dependence and institutional factors such as board size, affiliated
foundation, tax-exempt status, business classification, and membership type explained the likelihood of politi-
cal strategies including advocacy, lobbying, grassroots activity, and having a political action committee (PAC).
Organizational size characteristics such as budget, staff, and membership size mattered as well.
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Introduction
Interest groups dominate the American political system (Berry and Wilcox 2018). Their abilities to mobilize
resources and information influence the shape and direction of public policy, its actors, and its processes. In-
terest groups traditionally form around shared views or issues that they want to see reflected in public policy
outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 2001). Some interest groups organize around commercial, economic, and
occupational interests. These groups may include mutual-benefit nonprofits such as trade associations and
professional societies (Spillman 2012; Saitgalina et al. 2016). Political engagement is a tool these organizations
employ to promote change in public policy that advances their missions. Their members, who have a stake in
the outcomes of public policies, typically support such involvement.
Grossman and Helpman (2001) identified two common groups of activities that interest groups use for
their interest representation: activities that entail some form of information dissemination and activities that
provide resources to candidates and parties. The first group of activities includes such tactics as educating
the public (advocacy), informing and persuading legislators (lobbying), and mobilizing the public to action
(grassroots). The second group encompasses activities related to finance and campaign-giving to support or
oppose candidates for political office through political action committees (PACs).
The study of political activities of interest groups through a normative lens, which emphasizes controversy
and the seeming impunity of the actions, has been common (for review see Spillman 2012). Other studies fo-
cused on estimating the probability of success of various political strategies and tactics of interest groups (for
a review see Berry and Wilcox 2018). Yet, less is known about what organizational and environmental factors
shape the involvement strategies of professional and trade associations in the policy arena.
Further, there are many studies on public policy advocacy of charitable social and human service nonprofits
(Almog-Bar 2018; Smith and Pekkanen 2012; Fyall and Allard 2017), whereas fewer looked at these activities
Marina Saitgalina is the corresponding author.
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in trade and professional nonprofit associations. Understanding how the organizational capabilities of these
associations relate to their political engagement strategies would allow us to identify elements that underlie
the composition of political action. This research evaluates the effects of interest group politics and consid-
ers financial, regulatory, and organizational conditions underpinning the political involvement of trade and
professional associations.
This study considers two major theoretical approaches that have been used in examining human service
nonprofit’ advocacy efforts – institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). These theories argue that organizations are bound by and can leverage internal
and external factors and resources to achieve their goals. Thus, this study asks how resource dependence and
institutional theory can explain the choice of political strategies of trade and professional associations.
Kollman (1998) argued that professional and special interest groups representing businesses and industries
traditionally use insider tactics that allow them to lobby legislators directly or campaign for preferred candi-
dates, whereas public and social interest groups tend to use outside or indirect tactics of grassroots activism
and broader advocacy. Given that policy advocacy encompasses a variety of strategies, this study provides
insights into the interplay of resources and factors that leverage different public policy strategies of trade and
professional associations.
This study considers whether institutional norms such as tax-exempt status, affiliated foundations, type
of membership, and business classification as well as organizational resources like board size and revenue
derived from membership dues are associated with the choice of public policy strategy – lobbying, advocacy,
grassroots, or operating PACs. Organizations that serve professional, economic, or occupational interests and
have a definedmembership that pays annual dues, are the subject of this study. This research builds on previous
research in several ways. First, we focus on mutual-benefit nonprofits rather than traditionally studied human
service nonprofits. Second, we assess the relative impact of institutional factors and resources while controlling
for the size of trade and professional associations. Third, we encompass a variety of political strategy choices
rather than focusing on any single type.
This study uses a sample of associations from the dataset provided by the American Society of Association
Executives (ASAE) and the Center for Association Leadership. The survey data is used to test institutional




According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 309,150 religious, grantmaking, civic, professional, and sim-
ilar organizations in 2016 according to the North American Industry Classification System (US Census 2016).
Of these, about 59,400 are business, professional, labor, political, and similar organizations. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) recognized 63,866 501(c)(6) associations in 2016, which includes business leagues, chambers of
commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade, and professional football leagues, among others. However, some
professional associations can also be classified as 501(c)(3) educational, charitable, and scientific organizations,
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and local associations of employees or have no tax-exempt status under
IRS regulation. Thus, it is hard to estimate exactly how many occupational mutual-benefit nonprofits are out
there.
Those that receive some tax exemption do so because they offer public or member benefits. These may
include professional advancements such as in medicine or engineering, improved safety standards or occu-
pational norms, and licensing and professional certifications that ensure more widespread quality in services
that benefit all (Haynes and Gazley 2011). Another characteristic of these organizations is clearly definedmem-
bership, whether individual or corporate, which is distinguished through annually paid membership dues
(Spillman 2012). The focus of this paper – trade and professional associations – are organizations that serve the
industry, profession, or any other special interest, which includes a wide range of sectors from agriculture and
construction to sports and culture (ASAE: The Center for Association Leadership 2012).
Political Involvement
Knoke (1986) conveyed that “[w]henever associations attempt to influence governmental decisions, they are
acting as interest groups” (p. 2). Walker (1991) defined interest groups as organized associations with active
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memberships that express their interest in public policy. Coleman (1985) acknowledged that associations en-
gage in policy advocacy activities out of competition for resources and benefits for their members. Berry and
Wilcox (2018) and Spillman and Brophy (2018) recognized that trade and professional associations engage in
political activity to varying degrees that relate to their mission in its many forms including direct and indirect
lobbying, grassroots advocacy, voter education, and even campaign activity. The fact that trade and professional
associations can be incorporated under 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 501(c)(6) statuses, implies some restrictions on
the amount and type of political activities they can perform.
Political activity at its core is participation in public discourse. It connects diverse groups to governmental
institutions. It provides venues for civic engagement and contributes to the public representation of individ-
ual interests. Multiple political actors develop alternative channels for deliberation in the policy process to
raise their concerns and promote their agendas (LeRoux 2007). Various forms of political activity range from
indirect/outsider forms, such as advocacy and launching grassroots activity, to more direct and engaging in-
sider activities such as lobbying and forming of PACs in support or opposition to candidates running for office
(MacIndoe 2014).
Conceptual Framework
Scholars commonly used institutional and organizational characteristics and resources to explain the choice of
public policy strategies and tactics of charitable nonprofit organizations (MacIndoe 2014; Mosley 2010; Donald-
son 2007). Child and Gronbjerg (2007) found such organizational properties as size, funding sources, areas of
interest, partnershipswith other organizations, professional leadership, and administrative experience to be as-
sociated with measures of political advocacy in charitable nonprofits. Other research points to budget and staff
size (Miller-Steven and Gable 2012; Mosley 2011), revenue size, IRS status and affiliated foundations (Chand
2013), revenue source and subsector designation (NTEE) (Moulton and Eckerd 2012), and active membership
and mission of the organization (Smith and Pekkanen 2012), as determinants of nonprofit political activity.
To understand the use of various advocacy and lobbying strategies of trade and professional associations
we adopt a similar approach. Two major theories are used to understand the choices of policy advocacy tac-
tics – institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, Gerald, and
Salancik 1978). We test these two theories, which encapsulate various regulatory arrangements and available
organizational resources, against four different policy advocacy and lobbying tactics – public policy advocacy,
lobbying, grassroots activity, and having an affiliated PAC.
Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory posits that organizational behavior in its essence is driven by resource maximiza-
tion and cost minimization (Pfeffer, Gerald, and Salancik 1978). From a resource dependence standpoint, orga-
nizations seek resources and strive to efficiently use these resources to secure andmaintain the receipt of future
resources (Mosley 2010). Organizations tend to go after resources that ensure organizational success and pro-
vide a competitive advantage. Thus, the availability of resources determines organizational decisions and the
capacity to influence the environment, such as when organizations advocate or lobby in the policy arena.
Financial and human resources have traditionally been cited as capacity-building resources that enable ac-
tion (Mosley 2010; Child and Gronbjerg 2007). However, financial and human resources can have a variety of
impacts on organizational autonomy to make independent decisions (Walston and Khaliq 2012). For example,
reliance on any one single source of funding or lack of professional expertise on a board or staff may limit
the level and the choices of policy advocacy participation of a nonprofit organization (Mellinger and Kolomer
2013). More broadly, access to resources empowers an organization to mobilize for a broad range of actions in
the policy arena, whereas the lack of resources impedes these actions.
Revenues
Multiple studies found that reliance on a particular source of revenue, such as the government funding, affects
nonprofit policy advocacy (Buffardi, Pekkanen, and Smith 2015; Bass et al. 2007; Smith and Pekkanen 2012). Ac-
cording to Mellinger and Kolomer (2013), a higher percentage of restricted funding was associated with higher
levels of state legislative advocacy in human service nonprofits. Further, Mosley (2011) found that dependence
on government funding increased the use of insider tactics such as lobbying but had no effect on indirect tactics
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such as public policy advocacy. Trade and professional associations differ from traditional charitable nonprof-
its in that they derive some part of their annual revenue from membership dues and generally rely less on
government funding (Steinberg 2007). Although membership dues revenue falls under the unrestricted cate-
gory of funds, allowing the organization to make independent decisions about its expenses, heavy reliance on
membership dues revenue may also constrain an association’s engagement in the policy process. Thus, we can
assume a curvilinear relationship between the amount of revenue that an association derives frommembership
dues and its involvement in policy-related activities.
H1: Professional associations with most of their revenues derived from membership dues are less likely
to be engaged in all forms of political activity: advocacy, lobbying, the capacity to launch grassroots, and
affiliated PACs.
Board Size
Bai (2013) and Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda (2012) confirmed the connection between larger nonprofit boards
and positive organizational performance and program diversity. Further, Jaskyte (2013) found that board size
had an influence on administrative and technological innovations in a network of Communities In Schools
organizations. Ni and Zhan (2017) established the relationship between board size, program efficiency, and
revenue growth. Finally, Donaldson (2007) noted that board support was positively associated with a broad
range of nonprofit advocacy activities. Although the literature is largely inconsistent on the effects of board
size on political activism of nonprofit organizations (Gazley, Chang, and Bingham 2010; Saxton, Kuo, and Ho
2011), given the positive association between nonprofit board size and a variety of performance metrics, we
hypothesize that board size will be positively associated with more active facilitation of members’ interests
through advocacy and lobbying.
H2: Professional associations with larger boards are more likely to be engaged in all forms of political
activity: advocacy, lobbying, the capacity to launch grassroots, and affiliated PACs.
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory suggests that organizations’ behaviors are shaped by legitimacy concerns in the context of
their environments (Powell andDiMaggio 1991). In particular, the presence of regulatory standards and institu-
tional arrangements can determine the actions of organizations in response to environmental forces. The latter
may include local, state, and federal regulations, industry standards, and expectations of other stakeholders.
Organizational behavior in the policy arenamay be shaped by normative expectations stemming fromnonprofit
organizations’ affiliations or legal norms such as those that accompany charitable status. Legal restrictions may
limit legislative and politically charged nonprofit activity. On the other hand, separation of these activities un-
der different organizational entities may allow organizations to engage in a variety of political activities more
independently and with fewer restrictions.
The field of activity in which an association operates may also determine not only the expectations for po-
litical behavior but also the policy environment itself. For example, manufacturing industries may respond to a
heavier regulatory burden by engaging in more direct forms of political involvement. Associations’ stakehold-
ers may also exert pressure on their organizations to ensure that their interests are represented in public policy
choices. Institutional theory explains how an organization’s environment influences its roles and behaviors
(Mellinger and Kolomer 2013).
Foundations
Associations may establish affiliated foundations to diversify their assets, obtain tax-deduction status for in-
coming donations, or expand visibility to the public and the media (Sidman 2010). Martin (2004) asserted that
foundations provide a financial outlet to channel philanthropic giving into grassroots projects. Other common
reasons to establish a foundation include funding research, expanding existing services to non-members, or
establishing new programs that benefit the general public. Foundations promote broader benefits that associ-
ations can provide. A separate foundation may distinguish charitable expenses from lobbying to comply with
IRS regulations (Moore andMcAlexander 2005). Therefore, an association may feel more comfortable perform-
ing politically motivated activities, knowing it will not adversely affect its charitable activities. At the national
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level, Chand (2013) found that organizations with multiple tax-exempt statuses spent more on lobbying than
those that only had one tax-exempt status, although this did not apply to organizations with 501(c)(3) and
501(c)(4) designations compared to 501(c)(3) organizations.
H3: Professional associations that have an affiliated foundation are more likely to be engaged in the
lobbying form of political activity.
IRS Status: 501(c)(3) Vs. 501(c)(6)
Political activity, whereby an association seeks to represent the interests of its stakeholders in the policy arena,
has always been considered quite sensitive to certain organizational attributes, such as IRS tax-exempt status
(Reid 2006). All nonprofits exist to fulfill theirmission. Thesemissions to a large extent determine their nonprofit
tax-exempt status. Thus, there are differences in types of services provided, primary beneficiaries, and outcomes
that benefit the public, across different tax-exempt nonprofits. Tax-exemption also determines the extent of
public and community support and the range of associations’ political engagement. Ultimately, tax-exempt
status may affect how much influence these nonprofits exert in the political sphere. For example, a 501(c)(3)
status may deter professional associations from getting involved with controversial political activities (Bass
et al. 2007; Reid 2006). In particular, 501(c)(3) status imposes legal restrictions on lobbying and prohibits political
campaign involvement.
H4: Professional associations that have 501(c)(3) status are less likely to be engaged in the following forms
of political activity: lobbying and affiliated PACs.
Business Classification
The nonprofit literature suggests that mission drives nonprofit policy advocacy activities (MacIndoe 2014;
Child and Gronbjerg 2007; Mosley 2010). Mission has been operationalized in other studies as a nonprofit’s
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code (Child and Gronbjerg 2007), nonprofit subsector designa-
tion (Mosley 2010), or specialist/generalist distinction (MacIndoe 2014). Spillman and Brophy (2018) andHager
(2014) contended that associations from different specialization fields have different professional cultures, and
organizational and management standards. Technical professions such as engineering and manufacturing, as
well as economics-related professions have a history of being the gatekeepers of their professions and indus-
tries more so than cultural and educational associations (Halliday 1987). Since gatekeeping may assume exten-
sive filtering of incoming and outgoing information, one can expect that associations closely tied to areas of
profitable business activity are more likely to control the information field and policy space that affects them.
However, Buffardi, Pekkanen, and Smith (2015) did not find business classification to be related to a choice of
venue strategies for advocacy activities.
H5: Professional associations with the engineering and manufacturing business classification are more
likely to be engaged in the following forms of political activity: lobbying, capacity to launch grassroots,
and affiliated PACs.
Type of Membership
Other stakeholder characteristics such as membership size and type were used to control for their effects on
organizational political activity (Chand 2013). Membership type category has not been regularly used in the
literature on nonprofit political involvement since occupational nonprofitswere not commonly studied subjects.
Yet, in the practice of professional associations the type of membership – individual or corporate – accounts
for variance in membership values and benefits, primary associational activities, and organizational priorities
(Rominiecki 2016). Corporate membershipsmay bemore eager to see enacted policies or passed legislation that
benefits their industries, compared to individualmemberships. Thus,we can expect that corporatemembership
associations will be more engaged in direct political strategies that benefit their members.
H6: Professional associations that have organizations as their members are more likely to be engaged in
the following forms of political activity: lobbying and affiliated PAC.
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Methodology
Data
This research uses the data provided by the American Society of Association Executives (ASAE), which was
collected from theASAE Foundation’s Policies and Procedures survey in 2012. TheASAE represents 7,300 trade
and business associations and individual professional membership societies from a wide range of economic
sectors and professions. TheASAE Foundation, a charitable subsidiary, serves as a knowledge resource for their
member associations in the areas of associational management. The Policies and Procedures survey provides a
comprehensive look at professional associations and their activities in the U.S. The survey conducted in 2011–
12 provides a range of information in different areas of management – finances, governance, human resources,
membership structure and benefits, marketing, technology, education and development,meetings, government
affairs, etc. The survey captures the ways that associations conduct their business and how they operate.
The population includes both individual membership associations, as well as trade groups that serve pri-
marily companies and other business organizations. A sample of associations participating in the survey con-
tains 30 different interest areas including scientific, banking, retail, healthcare, and culture organizations among
others. The initial sample size of 750 observations had been reduced to 104 observations due to a significant
amount of missing and incomplete responses to the political engagement questions. The questions on political
engagement were located towards the end of the survey, which may have accounted for responders’ survey
fatigue and resulted in a significant percentage of missing answers (Olson 2014). Olson (2014) also suggested
that survey design, mode of delivery, survey length, and the number of survey contacts can contribute to a low
response rate. Finally, the nature of the questions, which may be considered sensitive, could have contributed
to the low response rate (Porter and Ecklund 2012). We ran an independent-samples t-test to ensure that the
smaller sample is representative of the original sample in its characteristics (Zimmerman 1997). The results of
the t-test did not reveal statistically significant variances for the two groups. Thus, it is safe to use the smaller
sample and generalize the findings to the larger sample of trade and professional associations.
All data came from the survey. Questions that were used included number of full-time employees, mem-
bership and budget size, proportion of revenues derived from membership dues, board size, presence of an
affiliated foundation, professional classification, type of membership, and questions about political and public
policy engagement strategies, namely advocacy, lobbying, grassroots efforts, and presence of affiliated PACs.
Dependent Variables
Public Policy Advocacy
IRS defines nonprofit advocacy as a range of public policy engagement activities that fall outside of lobbying,
which is more precisely defined by the federal regulations (IRS 2018). The Council on Foundations defines
advocacy as encompassing all types of involvement with policy decision-makers that do not meet the definition
of lobbying under the IRS. Other professional organizations and advocacy groups, for example Board Source or
the Alliance for Justice, define advocacy as actions in relation to public causes, policy changes, and government
decisions that express, communicate, educate, defend, recommend, and support specific public issues, causes,
or opinions (Board Source 2016; Alliance for Justice 2016). Occupational associations may seek to advance their
professions through advocacy. For example, the American Public Health Association influenced the creation of
the children’s health insurance program (Donaldson 2007). The public policy advocacy variable in this study
was measured by the question: ‘Does your organization engage in public policy or advocacy activities?’
Lobbying
According to the IRS (2018), “[d]irect lobbying refers to attempts to influence a legislative body through com-
munication with a member or employee of a legislative body, or with a government official who participates
in formulating legislation.” Professional associations can provide input and feedback to Congress or state leg-
islators on specific pieces of legislation affecting their practices. For example, the American Nurses Association
(ANA) employs lobbyists to present and promote the views and concerns of its members at the congressional
level to have favorable bills passed in the legislative process (Mason, Leavitt, and Chaffee 2013). The lobbying
variable was measured by the following question: ‘Does your organization engage in lobbying activities?’
6
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Grassroots Political Activity
Grassroots political activity is known as indirect lobbying. It refers to engagement in issue advocacy or an at-
tempt to influence legislation by mobilizing membership or the broader public concerning specific legislation,
and encouraging the public to act on it (IRS 2018). Membership associations can engage in grassroots politi-
cal activity, for example, through open letters with a call to action and petitions. They can also engage their
members and encourage them to reach out to non-members to take action. An example of grassroots political
activity is the way the ANA established the Nurses Strategic Action Team, a grassroots program, in response to
emerging healthcare reform issues (Cohen et al. 1996). The question ‘Does your organization have the capability
and authority to launch grassroots political activity?’ measured the capacity for grassroots activity variable.
Political Action Committee (PAC)
Some professional organizations utilize PACs to garner political influence. According to Grossman and Help-
man (2001), professional societies representing the healthcare industry use members’ taxable contributions to
create affiliated PACs to support preferred political candidates. The largest proportion of contributions goes to
candidates with the greatest ability to address the organization’s interests regardless of their political parties
(Ibid.). For example, the American Dietetic Association (ADA) created the American Dietetic Association Polit-
ical Action Committee (ADAPAC) in 1981 to support federal office candidates that favor ADA policies (Maillet,
Potter, and Heller 2002). The PAC variable is measured by the question ‘Does your organization operate a po-
litical action committee (PAC)?’
Each of these questions reflects a type of political engagement strategy. Each question has a binary Yes or
No choice. Yes is coded as 1 to indicate that an association performs a distinct form of political activity or can
get involved politically on behalf of its members. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and operationalization
of all variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean St.D.
Political Activity


















How many members are there in your organization (include all classes of
membership)?
104 13197.53 59382.29
Which of the following include the range of your organization’s budget? (Choose
only one)
  Less than $100,000
  $100,000 but less than $500,000
  $500,000 but less than $1,000,000
  $1,000,000 but less than $5,000,000
  $5,000,000 but less than $10,000,000
  $10,000,000 but less than $25,000,000
  $25,000,000 but less than $50,000,000
  $50,000,000 but less than $100,000,000
  Over $100,000,000
104 4.084 1.444
How many full-time equivalents (FTEs) are employed in your organization (all
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What percent of your organization’s total revenue was derived from member dues
in the last fiscal year?
104 38.880 22.010
Board Size
How many voting members are on your organization’s Board of Directors
(excluding any subsidiary organizations)?
104 24.153 58.350
Foundation









  501(c)(4), no exemption and other
104 1.46 0.678
Business Classification
What is the primary interest/subject area of your organization? (Check only one)
  Administration, Business/Commercial, Financial/Banking, Real Estate,
Wholesale/Retail
  Agriculture, Architecture/Engineering/Design, Automotive, Construction,
Energy/Utilities, Manufacturing – Equipment, Manufacturing – Raw Materials,
Scientific/Technical/Mathematics, Telecommunication, Transportation
  Healthcare Medical – Physicians, Healthcare Medical – Nursing, Healthcare
Medical – Allied Health Professions, Healthcare Medical – Other than Physicians
or Nurses
  Culture, Education, Environment, Hospitality/Tourism, International/Foreign
Affairs, Labor/Labor Unions, Law/Government, Law Enforcement, Social
Welfare/Civic Affairs, Sports/Athletics/Recreation, Other
104 2.439 1.104
Type of Membership





The following variables measure organizational resources and institutional characteristics. The revenues de-
rived from membership dues variable is measured by the question ‘What percent of your organization’s total
revenue was derived from member dues in the last fiscal year?’ The board size variable is captured using the
‘Number of voting boardmembers’ question. The affiliated foundation variable ismeasured by the survey ques-
tion ‘Does your organization have a foundation?’ with a binary answer option, where Yes was coded as 1 and
No as 0. The IRS tax-exempt status variable is measured by the question ‘What is the primary IRS tax status of
your organization (the primary or parent organization)?’ with answer options of 501(c)(6), 501(c) (3), 501(c) (4),
other, and not tax-exempt. These responses were consolidated into three groups: 501(c)(6) coded as 0, 501(c)(3)
coded as 1, and all the other categories coded as 2, with the first category being the baseline for comparison.
The business classification variable was derived from the following question ‘What is the primary interest/sub-
ject area of your organization?’ The survey provides 31 options, which were consolidated into four categories:
engineering/manufacturing (coded as 0), administrative/business (coded as 1), healthcare/medical (coded as
2), and other category (coded as 3), which included culture and arts, fraternities, sports, and education associa-
tions. The engineering/manufacturing category is used as a baseline for comparison. Finally, the membership
type variable was measured using the question ‘What kind of members belong to your organization?’ Answer
‘Individuals/Professionals’ was coded as 0 and ‘Companies/Institutions’ answer was coded as 1.
We control for organizational size, using three dimensions: membership size, budget size, and staff size.
Organizational size matters when considering the cost of political activism in charitable nonprofits (Child and
Gronbjerg 2007;Mosley 2010; Fyall andAllard 2017). The size of the associations ismeasured by three questions.
Membership size is gauged using the following question ‘How many members are there in your organization
(include all classes of membership)?’ The staff variable is measured using the question ‘How many full-time
equivalents (FTEs) are employed in your organization (all locations combined but exclude subsidiary or foun-
dation employees, if any)?’. The responses are reported in actual numbers. The budget variable is measured
by a categorical question: ‘Which of the following includes the range of your organization’ budget?’ with nine
categories as answer options. Responses were converted to natural logarithms for three variables: membership
8
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DE GRUYTER Saitgalina et al.
size, staff size, and board size, to normalize the data. Finally, a square term of revenue derived from dues was
added to all four regressions to account for a nonlinear relationship.
Analysis
Reduction in sample size has not significantly changed the composition across organizational characteristics.
The sample of 104 associations, on average, has 13,000 members, 25 full-time employees, and a budget that
ranges between one and five million dollars. The average size of the voting board is about 24 members. As-
sociations in the sample derive about 39 % of their revenues from membership dues. The sample consists of
56 % associations with an affiliated foundation. About 64 % of associations have 501(c)(6) status, 26 % have
501(c)(3) status, with the rest falling in all other categories. Associations in the sample are distributed almost
evenly among the four categories of business classifications, with nearly a quarter of organizations in each cat-
egory. About 59 % of associations have organizational members and 41 % are individual member associations.
Finally, about a third of the sampled organizations indicated that they engage in public policy advocacy ac-
tivities or have the capability and authority to launch grassroots political activity, and less than half indicated
that they engage in lobbying or operate a PAC. On average, surveyed associations engaged in one tactic out of
four, 2 % engaged in two tactics, 6 % engaged in three tactics, and 8 % engaged in all four tactics, with 39 %
indicating no political engagement across the four tactics.
Table 2 presents Pearson’s correlations for each pair of variables. Several paired correlations were significant
with only one being moderate in strength. The only paired correlation that is both moderate and significant is
between public policy advocacy and lobbying, which is not surprising since lobbying can be part of an advocacy
strategy. Since none of the paired variables displayed high correlations no data manipulation was performed.
9
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DE GRUYTER Saitgalina et al.
We use multiple logistic regression analysis since all four dependent variables are binary (Table 3). Logistic re-
gression produces probability estimates for logarithmically transformed outcome variables, which account for
nonlinear relationships between a categorical dependent variable and a set of independent variables (Baldauf
and Santos Silva 2012). We found support of both resource dependence and institutional theories explaining
the choices of political activities in trade and professional associations.




B B B B
Membership Size (Log) −0.401 −0.505** 0.288 0.091
Budget Size −0.596 −0.611* −0.671 0.325
Staff Size (Log) 1.120* 1.091*** −0.543 −0.459
Dues Revenue 0.088 0.055 −0.030 −0.046
Squared Dues Revenue −0.001 −0.001* 0.000 −0.000
Board Size (Log) 2.508** 1.086** 1.276 −0.369
Foundation 1.834** 1.269** 2.328** 0.237
IRS Status
501(c)(3) 0.290 −0.926 −0.545 −2.464**
501(c)(4), No Exemption and
Other
−0.618 0.168 −1.470 −0.800
Business Classification
Admin/Business −0.314 −0.119 1.349 2.270**
Healthcare/Medical 3.844** 0.770 2.454** −0.009
Other −0.078 0.387 0.322 −1.591*
Type of Membership
Corporate Membership 0.550 −0.592 3.091** 1.076
Constant −5.103* 0.125 −1.506 −1.680
Pseudo R2 = 0.332 Pseudo R2 = 0.192 Pseudo R2 = 0.294 Pseudo R2 = 0.330









Sample size = 104; p < 0.000, * sig. at 0.10, ** sig. at 0.05, ***sig. at 0.01
Our first regression explained about 33 % of the variation in public policy advocacy activity of trade and profes-
sional associations. Overall, organizations with larger staff and boards, those that have affiliated foundations,
and those that operate in the healthcare field, are more likely to perform public policy advocacy activities.
Specifically, larger boards increase the chances of an association being involved in public policy activity, which
supports resource dependence hypothesis 2. Institutional theory hypothesis 3 is also supported since the pres-
ence of an affiliated foundation is positively associated with the probability of public policy activity. Further,
associations that operate in a healthcare or medical field are more likely to perform public policy activities
compared to engineering and manufacturing associations, a relationship which was not hypothesized. Finally,
associations with larger staff are more likely to engage in public policy advocacy, which is consistent with the
previous literature on the effects of organizational size on policy advocacy activity (Child and Gronbjerg 2007;
Mosley 2010; Fyall and Allard 2017).
The second regression explained close to 20 % of lobbying activity. Notably, larger membership and budget
size decrease the chance that associations lobby, whereas larger staff increases it. Larger boards increase the
likelihood that an association lobbies, which supports resource dependence hypothesis 2. The presence of an
affiliated foundation also increases the probability of lobbying activity, which supports institutional theory
hypothesis 3. Finally, the squared term of the portion of revenue derived from membership dues is negative
and significant, suggesting that there is an inverse curvilinear relationship between revenues that come from
dues and associational lobbying, which supports the resource dependence assumption that overreliance on a
single source of revenue may limit the overall engagement of associations in political activities. Hypothesis 1 is
partially supported.
Three variables reached statistical significance in the third regression model and together explain about
29 % of the variation in capacity to launch grassroots activity. Overall, associations that have affiliated founda-
tions, operate in the medical/healthcare field and have corporate members are more likely to have the capacity
to launch grassroots activity, which supports hypothesis 3, but rejects hypotheses 5 and 6. Neither of the orga-
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nizational size measures nor the size of the board or IRS status had any effect on the capability and authority
to launch grassroots activity.
The fourth regression explains about 33 % of the variance in having an affiliated PAC, with IRS status and
business classification variables reaching statistical significance. Overall, associations that operate in the ad-
ministrative/business sphere but not in culture, environment, or social and civic affairs, and those that are not
501(c)(3)s, are more likely to have affiliated PACs. Specifically, the odds of a professional association having
an affiliated PAC are lower for associations with a 501(c)(3) IRS status compared to associations with 501(c)(6)
status, supporting institutional theory hypothesis 4. In addition, the odds of having an affiliated PAC are higher
for the administrative/business classification but lower, for the ‘Other’ category (which includes various cul-
ture, environment, social and civic affairs associations) compared to engineering/manufacturing associations.
Thus, hypothesis 5 was both partially rejected and partially supported.
Discussion
Political engagement strategies draw on different organizational resources and can be constrained by the regu-
latory and industry environment. Our study reveals the relationship between resources and characteristics on
one hand and the choice of political strategies on the other hand.
Our empirical examination bears evidence that both resource dependence and institutional factors are as-
sociated with the variance in policy advocacy tactics. The explanatory power of both theories varied across
different forms of political engagement. In particular, we found evidence that supports resource dependence
theory hypotheses with advocacy and lobbying tactics, but not with the capacity to launch grassroots activity
or having an affiliated PAC. Larger boards are associated with increased advocacy and lobbying activity. On
the other hand, overreliance on a single financial source, such as membership dues decreases the chances of
lobbying activity.
Resource dependence theory highlighted the boundary-spanning capability of association boards. Board
members’ connections and expertise can help expand an organization’s influence on its environment (Miller-
Millesen 2003). Occupational interest groups with larger boards can be more visible and have more prominent
members of their professions, and possess more cumulative expertise and knowledge, which can translate into
more active advocacy and lobbying efforts.
Reliance on a single source of funding such as membership dues had a negative effect on lobbying activity.
Previous studies found that government funding was associated with an increase in lobbying (Mosley 2011)
and policy advocacy (MacIndoe 2014). Here we see the reverse relationship. As association relies more on
membership dues for its budget it is less likely to engage in lobbying activity. Associations that rely heavily
on membership dues may spend more on direct member benefits rather than external political engagement
activities since their financial sustainability depends more on annual membership renewals.
Institutional theory factors such as affiliated foundation, IRS status, business classifications, and type of
membership relate to various forms of political activity, both in expected and unexpected ways. Similar to
Chand’s Chand (2013) findings, the presence of an affiliated foundation facilitates all tactics except for having a
PAC. Presence of an affiliated foundation can be a result of organizational growth and diversification. Affiliated
foundations allow associations to expand programming and capture resources available only to charitable non-
profits. Organizational affiliates help to maintain autonomy and legal independence over different activities.
Separate foundations can isolate charitable and political activities to allowmore flexibility for associations to be
more active in the public policy arena. Future research should examine how trade and professional associations
create 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(6) affiliates and the purposes they serve.
As expected, IRS status is negatively associated with politically charged PAC tactics (Bass et al. 2007; Reid
2006). Creating PACs to endorse or oppose candidates for office is forbidden for 501(c)(3) organizations. Re-
gardless of whether associations are created to advance professions or to serve social public missions, they
operate in the same legal environment. Unlike 501(c)(6) associations, those with charitable tax-exempt status
must abide by more stringent rules of political activity or potentially invite close IRS and public scrutiny.
Healthcare and medical associations are more likely to perform advocacy and have the capability and au-
thority to organize and launch grassroots activity than engineering and manufacturing associations. The liter-
ature provides many examples of healthcare and medical professional associations being active in the political
arena (Mahlin 2010; Maillet, Potter, and Heller 2002; Mason, Leavitt, and Chaffee 2013), suggesting a long-
standing tradition of these organizations being an active voice in government decision making. This study
provides further evidence that professional associations in the healthcare field engage more in policy advo-
cacy.
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Further, administrative and business associations such as those in commercial, banking, retail, and real
estate industries are more likely to have affiliated PACs compared to engineering and manufacturing associa-
tions. Although both categories represent large industries, financial and banking industries are overseen more
broadly by elected officials than narrow regulatory agencies and therefore better positioned to influence public
policy by supporting candidates for office. Finally, associations in a broad spectrum of environmental, tourism,
and sports industries, were less likely to have an affiliated PAC than engineering and manufacturing associa-
tions. Most of these associations may fall under the charitable category, hence be banned from engaging in
partisan political activity.
Finally, although we expected corporate membership associations to be more active through direct forms of
political action, we found the opposite. They were more likely to have the capacity to launch grassroots activity
compared to individual membership associations. This can be attributed to their broader reach through organi-
zational members. They have the capacity to appeal to employees of member organizations and by extension to
wider public audiences. Therefore, these associations are better positioned to tap into the established resources
of their corporate members to engage in public mobilization tactics such as grassroots.
Not surprisingly, political activity was a function of organizational size. Associations with bigger staff are
more likely to engage in lobbying, suggesting that some of their staff were hired as professional lobbyists. Con-
trary to many other studies, however (Child and Gronbjerg 2007; Mosley 2010; Fyall and Allard 2017), budget
and membership size have a negative relationship with lobbying tactics. It is possible that these associations
primarily focus on engaging their members and spending more on membership activities. Considering wider
access to resources, bigger associations may see less value in lobbying when compared to their other priori-
ties. More research is needed to understand whether the amount of resources affects the choices of political
strategies of trade and professional associations.
This research focused on characteristics described by two commonly cited theories that have been found to
explain organizational behavior and strategies of charitable nonprofits (Moulton and Eckerd 2012; Mellinger
and Kolomer 2013; Mosley 2010). Yet, other organizational and environmental characteristics could influence
the political involvement of trade and professional nonprofit associations. Our findings also did not reveal the
extent to which political tactics were used. Thus, it remains an open question of how much trade and profes-
sional associations engage in the policy arena. Associations can leverage their boards for advocacy and lobbying
efforts and their corporate members to increase capacity to launch grassroots activities. However, just like their
charitable counterparts, they are bound by regulatory limitations of political activity.
Conclusion
Trade and occupational associations that serves the interests of industries and professions, can be quite promi-
nent players in the policy arena where they seek to represent the interests of their stakeholders. Learning about
what defines and shapes their political involvement allows for a better understanding of the inner workings of
this understudied subsector.
Overall, in line with the literature on charitable public policy advocacy, we found several connections be-
tween resource dependencies, institutional arrangements, and political tactics, suggesting that many factors
affect the choice of political tactics among trade and professional associations. Yet, it is also clear that these fac-
tors do not explain everything. Future studies should investigate what other organizational and environmental
characteristics may affect public policy advocacy strategy choices.
Our findings have important implications for nonprofit practitioners. Organizational leaders interested in
increasing their advocacy tactics may learn from healthcare associations about how to step up their advocacy
efforts, and from business and real estate associations on why they choose PACs to advance their interests. Fur-
ther, associations can employ their corporatemember connections to launch grassroots campaigns and use their
boards to expand their advocacy and lobbying efforts. Finally, affiliated foundations may insulate parent asso-
ciations to perform a variety of political activities. The importance of organizational resources and recognition
of potential dependencies should not be overlooked when considering political engagement strategies.
These findings should be generalized with caution, however. Our limited sample of associations does not
allow for broad generalizations of our conclusions to the rest of the trade and professional associations popula-
tion, especially those that are not ASAE members. Further, the cross-sectional nature of the data only points at
correlations among variables; future studies should attempt to collect longitudinal data to establish causations.
Nonetheless, our analysis provides an important step toward identifying what determines the political en-
gagement strategy choices of trade and professional associations in the U.S. Our study contributes to the liter-
ature by providing evidence that resource dependence and institutional theories help explain the participation
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of professional associations in policy making activities. Future studies may explore other theories that explain
political strategy choices of professional associations.
Professional associations are engaged in developing and shaping policies that directly or indirectly affect
their stakeholders using various forms of activity including direct lobbying or issue advocacy, mobilizingmem-
bers and other stakeholders or endorsing or opposing political candidates. Resources and environment both
shape these organizations’ decisions in the political arena and determine their ways of influencing public poli-
cies. This study has shed light on how organizational and environmental determinants of occupational interest
groups shape their choices of political involvement strategies. Although this study does not encompass the full
scope and range of all occupational nonprofits, it points the way to a fuller exploration of this important area
of nonprofit policy research.
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